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We propose capability as a universal or type intermediate 
between function and disposition. A capability is, broadly 
speaking, a disposition that is of a type whose instances can be 
evaluated on the basis of how well they are realized. A function, 
on the view we are proposing, is a capability the possession of 
which is the rationale for the existence of its bearer. To say for 
example that a water pump has the function to pump water is to 
say that the pump exists because something was needed that 
would pump water. A water pump may have many capabilities, 
including: to be weatherproof, to run without lubricant, to be 
transportable, and so forth. But its function is to pump water. 
We focus here on capabilities possessed by humans – such as 
piano playing or language using – and we explore the relation 
between capabilities of these sorts and structures in the brain. 
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Introduction 
‘Disposition’ is a class in Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) whose 
instances are, for example, the fragility of this glass, the 
irascibility of this old geezer, the solubility of this chunk of salt. 
Dispositions are potentials for this or that to happen, and they 
are realized when the right trigger or circumstance arises 
(sometimes, as in the case of a beating heart, always). 
Dispositions specifically depend for their existence on their 
bearers and – unlike roles, such as the student role or the lawyer 
role – they are dependent only on their bearers. Hence, they are, 
according to BFO, internally grounded, specifically dependent, 
realizable entities.  
 
BFO 2.0 elucidates disposition as follows: 
 
d is a disposition means: 
 d is a realizable entity, 
 & d ’s bearer is some material entity, 
 & d is such that, if it ceases to exist, then its bearer is 
physically changed, 
 & d ’s realization occurs when and because this 
bearer is in some special physical circumstances, 
 & this realization occurs in virtue of the bearer’s 
physical make-up (1). 
 
One subclass of ‘disposition’ is formed by those dispositions 
which provide the rationale for the existence of their bearers. A 
disposition of this sort is called a ‘function’. Here ‘rationale’ 
covers both cases where functions exist in reflection of 
evolutionarily development (as in the case of lungs or hearts) 
and cases where functions exist in reflection of intentional 
design (as in the case of the water pump and other material 
artifacts). In BFO: 
 
f is a function means: 
 f is a disposition, 
 & f exists in virtue of its bearer’s physical make-up, 
 & this make-up is something that this bearer 
possesses because it came into being, either through 
evolution (in the case of natural biological entities) or 
through intentional design (in the case of artifacts), in 
order to realize processes of a certain sort (1). 
 
Examples include: the function of amylase to break down starch 
into sugar, reflecting the fact that the disposition to break down 
starch into sugar was evolutionarily selected for; and the 
function of a hammer to drive nails, which exists because the 
hammer was designed to bear a disposition to drive in nails (1).  
Spear et al. (2) note that,  
The notion of function is indispensable to our understanding of 
distinctions such as that between being broken and being in 
working order (for artifacts) and between being diseased and 
being healthy (for organisms). 
Functions go hand in hand with the gradeability of their 
realizations. (Compare the treatment of ‘normativity’ in (2).) 
Your heart may pump well, or it may pump less well, and the 
latter is sometimes associated with the presence of disease (3–
6).  
However, there appears to be a further class of dispositions 
whose instances are also evaluated based on how well they are 
realized but whose bearers were not created specifically to 
realize that disposition as a matter of evolutionary selection or 
intentional design. This class of disposition is broader than that 
of function. More recently the term ‘capability’ has been 
mooted as an appropriate term to describe entities in this 
intermediate class (7). A capability is (roughly) a disposition 
whose realization brings benefits to some organism or group of 
organisms. Those capabilities which constitute the primary 
reason for the existence of the bearer (either as a matter of 
evolutionary biology or as a matter of intentional design) we 
call functions.  
 
Both organisms and artifacts can have capabilities. For 
example, my hands are capable of opening cans of sparkling 
water and my car is capable of keeping me warm. In both of 
these examples the disposition is not a mere disposition. Rather, 
it is a disposition that in typical circumstances brings benefits 
to an organism interacting with the bearer of this disposition or 
to an organism that itself bears this disposition. Such benefits 
can be graded on a scale (in some cases on multiple scales). 
Thus, capabilities are not mere dispositions. But they are also 
not functions. They are a class of realizable entities 
intermediate between the two. 
Some capabilities are distinguished in that they can be realized 
by their bearers’ deliberately and in such a way as to bring 
concordant benefit to the bearer. For example, the capability to 
play the guitar is something the guitarist realizes on purpose and 
something that brings benefit to the guitarist (as also, 
potentially, to other organisms).  A car’s capability to warm its 
passenger, in contrast, is never intentionally realized by its 
bearer, nor does the production of heat benefit the car itself; 
rather, it is the passengers who are benefited by being kept 
warm. To capture these cases, where a capability can be 
intentionally realized by and for the benefit of its bearer we 
introduce the further term ability.  
A still narrower class is that of mental ability – for example the 
ability to perform mental arithmetic. These are abilities that, in 
contrast to the case of playing tennis, or playing the guitar, can 
be realized purely mentally. 
Methods 
We shall use ‘ability’ to refer to a realizable entity that (i) has 
an organism as its bearer and (ii) is such that its possession 
and/or realization brings benefit to this bearer and (iii) is 
realizable deliberately (thus on the basis of an intention of the 
bearer). Thus, plants, fungi, and unicellular organisms bear no 
abilities.  
This paper assumes that mental properties supervene on the 
physical properties of the brain and nervous system. Given this 
assumption, when mental capabilities are acquired, there must 
be some physical change in the brain. We will present evidence 
that the acquisition of abilities on the part of a human being is 
in some cases correlated with the development of novel 
neuronal structures. The relevance of cases of this sort would 
turn on the fact that the entities in question would be examples 
of mental functions – since they would be capabilities whose 
bearers have evolved (or better: developed) to realize 
dispositions of the given sort.  
We here consider three examples: being able to carry out 
arithmetical operations in one’s head, being able to speak a 
second language, and being able to play a musical instrument. 
All of these are such that they can be exercised deliberately. We 
postulate that there are networks formed in the brain in the 
process of acquiring such abilities, and that these networks are 
the bearers of the corresponding acquired dispositions. (Note 
that we here use the term ‘bearer’ in the narrow sense, following 
BFO; in common speech we often speak of the whole organism 
as bearer in such cases.)  
Evidence for the Existence of Abilities  
Mental Arithmetic 
Starting with the case of mental arithmetic, (8) points to 
evidence to the effect that, first, there are a number of shifts in 
the neuronal networks in children between second and third 
grade and that, second, some of these developments, such as 
greater connectivity in visual-processing areas, are directly 
related to learning arithmetic: 
[Our] results suggest that the development of numerical skills is 
characterized not just by a shift to dorsal PPC areas involved in 
visuo-spatial attention, but also to ventral visual areas that are 
involved in higher-order visual processing. We suggest that 
ventral visual areas contribute to arithmetic skill development by 
building improved perceptual and mnemonic representations for 
numerical problems (8). 
Furthermore, it is clear that damage to certain areas of the brain 
will impair arithmetic function (9). In addition, (8) found that 
when a child learns arithmetic there are “significant task-related 
changes in brain response and connectivity.” 
The authors found also that performing arithmetical 
calculations correlates with the coordination of multiple parts 
of the brain. This is inferred from the significant activation 
found when children do arithmetic in the pre-supplementary 
motor Area (preSMA), bilateral anterior insula cortex (AIC), 
and the visual cortex (VC) (8). 
Mental arithmetic is clearly an ability in our sense of the term. 
Arithmetic is done intentionally, and people can be better or 
worse at doing mental arithmetic, can improve their skill with 
practice, and in typical circumstances benefit from the 
performance of this skill. It is indeed a widely shared ability, 
and it would seem that everyone (even the uneducated) have the 
ability to perform very simple calculations, so that it is 
considered to be abnormal (and in some cases a disability) if 
one is unable to carry out such calculations to a certain level.  
This difference in skill might be explained by pointing to the 
finding in (8) to the effect that there are task-related changes in 
connectivity which occur when children engage in tasks that 
train mental arithmetic. Although the neuronal networks that 
bear the ability to perform mental arithmetic exist before this 
ability is exercised, practicing mental arithmetic certainly 
changes the connectivity of these structures. Arithmetic can 
thus be considered as an ability that is in part innate and which 
can be developed through practice. Many human abilities are 
similar in this regard. Jumping, running, and eating are all 
abilities that are innate in this sense.  
Speaking a Second Language 
Mechelli, et al. (10) provide evidence for structural changes to 
the brain induced through training that results in proficiency in 
a second language. They found that there were measurable 
differences in the density of grey matter in those subjects who 
were proficient in a second language (10). Grey matter consists 
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mainly of the cell bodies of neurons (11), and the increase in 
grey matter density implies the genesis of new neurons in those 
regions. 
In this case, too, the increase in brain matter density can be 
understood as a matter of developments in an existing structure, 
rather than as the appearance of a new structure. This means 
that the learning of a second language indirectly causes 
modifications to neuronal networks in the brain.  
The difference in density is more pronounced in those who 
learned their second language earlier in life, reflecting the fact 
that this may be the result of a more natural process (informal 
socialization rather than formal learning). Whether (or the 
degree to which) the structures developed in language learning 
are simply extensions of existing networks of neurons or should 
be understood as separate networks altogether may thus depend 
in part on when the language was learned.  
Playing a Musical Instrument 
Acquiring the ability to play a musical instrument has been 
shown to go hand in hand with the development of associated 
neuronal networks. Elbert et al. (12) found that string players – 
specifically, violinists who fret with their left hand – had greater 
cortical representation in the brain for their left hands than the 
control group, and that the amount of cortical representation 
correlated with the age the subject learned to play. 
Croom also notes that musical training can cause “significant 
changes in the function and organization of the brain” (13). 
Croom asserts further that neuroplasticity – the capability of the 
brain both to develop existing neuron networks and to create 
new networks – is greater in musicians than in non-musicians. 
Additionally, “musicians that practiced the piano since 
childhood had a more structured pyramidal tract than non-
musicians”. Moreover, “white-matter bundles pertaining to the 
motor circuits in the brain are better structured in musicians 
than non-musicians” (13).  
Capability Bearing Structures 
We take it that our three examples of ability are different 
enough to allow for some reasonable generalization to other 
examples of abilities such as computer programming skill or 
map reading ability – namely that the acquisition of these 
abilities, too, involves significant changes in underlying neural 
networks.  
In each case it is shown that the acquisition of the ability 
correlates with significant changes in the brain. Though these 
changes are required for one to have an ability, they do not seem 
to bear abilities themselves. This is in large part because when 
exercising an ability, like playing the violin, the musician 
doesn’t intentionally realize the dispositions in her brain – these 
dispositions are realized involuntarily – she simply realizes her 
disposition (her ability) to play the violin. 
Thus, the structural changes in the brain that correlate to the 
acquisition of an ability bear capabilities. The specific 
boundaries of the brain structures are largely unknown, we refer 
to them nonetheless as ‘capability bearing structures’, pointing 
out that these boundaries will be a matter of gradations rather 
than of physical discontinuities. We will refer in what follows 
to an ability bearing structure that is a network of neurons found 
in the brain as a “capability bearing network”. The question of 
interest is whether capability-bearing networks bear 
evolutionary functions, artifact functions, roles, or some other 
class of realizable entity.  
Do these networks bear biological functions? 
It is relatively clear that the ability to perform arithmetic, the 
ability to speak a second language, and the ability to play a 
musical instrument are distinguished from a mere disposition in 
that they intentionally realized. These abilities are trained by the 
organism, which results in the acquisition or further 
development of the ability in conjunction with a change in 
neuron networks in the brain. The networks themselves are not, 
however, intentionally developed. When a novice pianist learns 
to play piano, the ability is acquired intentionally through 
deliberate practice by the pianist. Yet, a pianist need not intend 
that anything happen to the structures in her brain for those 
structures to change. Finally, while the processes that are 
realized by the pianist’s piano playing ability are realized 
intentionally, this is not the case of the processes carried out by 
the underlying neuron networks.   
If the above-mentioned abilities are dispositions, then they are 
dispositions with a purpose (they are intentionally acquired and 
intentionally realized). However, it seems that they cannot be 
biological functions in BFO’s sense. This is because entities 
like contemporary languages and musical instruments were 
introduced too recently in our history for a disposition (say) to 
speak Italian or to play the viola to be borne by an ability-
bearing structure that would have been evolutionarily selected 
for. The case is less obvious for arithmetic reasoning. For all we 
know, there may have been some evolutionarily significant 
advantage for those who had ability-bearing structures that bore 
this ability. However, it is at the same time clear that the ability 
to perform arithmetic using Arabic symbols is again too recent 
in our evolutionary history for a corresponding, selected-for 
ability-bearing structure to exist (14). 
Of course, this is not to say that there are no language-, music- 
or arithmetic-related functions of any sort. There may, for 
example, be brain structures bearing functions (such as: to 
develop specialized pattern recognition skills or to manipulate 
abstract systems) that are of relevance to the acquisition of the 
mentioned abilities. 
Do these Structures bear Artifact Functions? 
Given that the dispositions borne by the ability-bearing 
structures described are not biological functions, one might 
consider whether they are artifact functions. The structures do 
indeed appear to be artifact-like in the sense that they are 
brought about, at least in part, by intentional human 
intervention. One might go so far as to describe the process of 
learning, or instructing someone, to play the piano as the 
process of producing a piano player. Production of this sort 
requires also the production of relevant piano-playing ability-
bearing structures.  
Production in this sense, however, does not involve the creation 
of a designed object and this is what is needed if the produced 
entity is to count as having a function in the BFO sense. Rather, 
what is created is, precisely, an ability, something that is similar 
to an artifact in that it is an entity created as a consequence of 
intentional actions on the part of one or more agents. In creating 
the ability we do indeed bring about changes in a specific parts 
of the brain of the subject involved. But these changes do not 
(or at least: do not given our current technology) give rise to 
entities in the brain that are designed. The development of 
ability-bearing structures is rather merely a by-product of 
developing an ability.  
For these reasons, ability bearing structures are not artifacts and 
the dispositions they bear are not artifact functions. 
Do these Structures bear Roles? 
Roles in BFO are externally grounded realizable entities. Given 
that acquired abilities are neither mere dispositions nor 
functions, it is worth discussing why they are also not roles. 
BFO 2.0 defines role as follows: 
 
r is a role means: 
 r is a realizable entity 
& r exists because there is some single bearer that is 
in some special physical, social, or institutional set of 
circumstances in which this bearer does not have to be 
& r is not such that, if it ceases to exist, then the 
physical make-up of the bearer is thereby changed. 
 
Paradigmatic examples of roles are administrative in nature. 
When someone becomes a student (for example by signing the 
corresponding forms and receiving an appropriate validating 
stamp from the salient authorities), then they take on the student 
role. This role is realized in processes such as: doing 
homework, paying tuition, attending classes. What enables 
someone to participate in each of these processes is that some 
institution has acknowledged the person’s status as a student. 
Importantly, nothing need change physically or psychologically 
on a person who becomes a student; the required changes are 
institutional, rather than physical.  
Other examples of roles are also social. Consider a key that 
takes on the role of being the key that opens my front door. 
Suppose I need to change the locks in my house, so I purchase 
new set of locks and keys. At the beginning of the day the new 
keys are effectively useless to me, but then, after installing the 
new locks, the keys become very important: it now unlocks my 
door. During the process of the key’s going from useless to 
important, nothing internal changes about the key. All of the 
relevant changes are external to the key (namely the old locks 
being replaced by the new locks). In this way the role of key 
that opens my front door is externally, not internally, grounded. 
The realizable entities borne by ability-bearing structures are 
not roles because they are internally grounded. It is impossible, 
for example, for a person to lose the ability to play the piano 
unless that person undergoes some physical change. The same 
is true of the ability to perform arithmetic or the ability to speak 
a second language. 
Results 
In order to account for abilities like playing a musical 
instrument or using language, we introduce the following 
definitions. 
 
c is a capability means:  
c is a disposition  
& c’s realization in the normal case brings benefits to 
an organism or group of organisms, where ‘in the 
normal case’ means not only: in the normal range on 
the scale, but also: in a context that is normal for the 
group to which the bearer or user belongs (7). 
a is an ability means:  
 
a is a capability  
& a’s realization is intended by the bearer  
 
The class of capabilities is meant to capture those dispositions 
that are evaluable on a scale of how well the processes that 
realize the dispositions are realized. Some capabilities are 
realized intentionally, and these we term ‘abilities’. As such, 
abilities are capabilities that can only be borne by things that 
are capable of intentional action. We might also classify the 
bearers of capabilities on the basis of what kind of process 
realizes the capability.  
Introducing ‘capability’ enables us to formulate a new 
definition of BFO: function to read: 
 
f is a function means: 
 f is a capability, 
 & f exists in virtue of its bearer’s physical make-up, 
 & this make-up is something that this bearer possesses 
because it came into being, either through evolution 
(in the case of natural biological entities) or through 
intentional design (in the case of artifacts), in order to 
realize processes of a certain sort. 
 
All functions are capabilities because all functions can be 
assessed on how well they are realized. This requires a 
normative standard for evaluation, and we believe that it is 
possible to have such standard only in the case that there is some 
benefit that is being brought to an organism or group of 
organisms. (In the case of evolved capabilities this may be: 
survival.) Mere dispositions can be described in terms of how 
they are realized, but they cannot be evaluated (graded on a 
scale) in the way that is possible for capabilities and thus also 
for functions. For example, a car has a disposition to make 
engine noise. The different dispositions to make engine noise 
possessed by various cars will be realized differently in a 
measurable way: some cars will have louder engines than 
others. However, this disposition becomes a capability only 
when a normative standard is in play. Suppose that someone 
uses the noise of their car to scare away racoons. In this case, 
we can identify the car as having the capability to scare away 
racoons, and as such an evaluative standard is introduced; the 
better the car can scare away racoons, the more desirable the 
car. In this case, louder cars are evaluated more positively in 
terms of their racoon scaring power.  
 
The standard that appears common to all functions is whether 
or not the realized process is the process, which the bearer was 
designed to realize. For example, cars were designed to 
transport one or more persons. If a car does not enable such 
transport, it is not realizing its function. The same goes for 
biological structures; a heart realizes its function of pumping 
blood, if it successfully pumps blood.  
 
A process that an artifact or biological structure was designed 
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to perform is necessarily a capability, since it serves the interest 
of at least one organism. The function of any organ, for 
example, benefits the organism in that it allows the organism to 
survive more easily than it otherwise would. Vestigial organs, 
like the appendix, still have a function, since its realization 
could benefit the organism it is a part of. However, since the 
environment does not require that this function be realized, the 
appendix never realize their function.  
 
Similarly, artifacts that possess functions are designed to bring 
benefit to some organism, otherwise they would not be 
designed. Even destructive artifacts like nuclear weapons bring 
some benefit to the ones dropping the bomb, despite the horrific 
destruction that they cause.  
 
One might object that someone might design an artifact to 
realize a process that is not beneficial to any organism. If the 
realization of this process is not beneficial to any organism, then 
it cannot be a capability. Would this not be an example of a 
function that is not a capability?  
 
The natural response to this is to maintain that this artifact has 
no function. It was designed with a disposition, but since there 
is no benefit that it brings to any organism, there is no 
evaluative standard by which we can judge how well this 
process is carried out. As such, there is no way to judge how 
well the process realized by the designed disposition is carried 
out, meaning that it cannot be a function.  
 
Moreover, suppose that two of these artifacts are created. As 
soon the question is asked, “which artifact function better”, we 
need an evaluative standard. Notice “functioning better” 
requires a normative evaluation. This is different than asking 
“which artifact makes the louder noise”, or “which artifact can 
withstand greater heat?” These are descriptive questions, which 
can be descriptively evaluated in order to learn more about the 
dispositions of each artifact. Asking which artifact is better, 
necessarily implies a normative standard against which the 
function is compared, and in order to have such a standard, there 
much be some good that is trying to be reached. This good is 
the benefit that it brings to organisms. 
Reed and Dumontier [16] use the term ‘capability’ in the 
Semanticscience Integrated Ontology (SIO) to mean roughly 
what is meant in BFO by ‘disposition’. They then distinguish 
‘capability’ and ‘disposition’ in the following way: 
“[t]herefore, a ‘capability’ in SIO is about the mere possibility 
while a ‘disposition’ focuses on the likelihood” [16]. We take 
this to mean that a SIO disposition is a SIO capability that is 
likely to occur. The distinction between a BFO disposition and 
a BFO capability is a more substantial and useful distinction 
than that of SIO. Likelihoods and probabilities are able to be 
ascribed to dispositions numerically. Moreover, a set of SIO 
capabilities that are likely and therefore SIO dispositions will 
vary with context and domain. As a result, this distinction does 
not seem to belong in a top-level ontology. 
By contrast, the difference between BFO disposition and a BFO 
capability introduces a basic class distinction. Capabilities are 
a particular kind of disposition – ones that can benefit some 
organism when realized. Since it is still possible within BFO to 
describe the likelihood that a particular disposition or capability 
will be realized, BFO’s distinction both more accurately 




What is distinctive about capabilities is that they bring a 
gradable benefit to some organism. Note that ‘benefit’, here, is 
not to be understood as having any moral implications. For 
example, a professional assassin might possess the capability to 
kill someone and make it look like an accident. This is a 
capability of the assassin, because it brings benefits to himself 
and to his employer. 
Although all dispositions (including capabilities and abilities) 
can be potentially beneficial in their realizations, capabilities 
are set apart from mere dispositions in that their realization 
normally bring benefits. For example, a beer glass has the 
disposition to shatter. However, it does not have the capability 
to shatter, since in the normal case its shattering brings no 
benefit to any organism. In the normal case means: reliable, 
regularly, expectedly, as a result of the nature of the capability 
itself and of its bearer (potentially also of its owner, employer, 
and so forth).  
The examples of abilities we addressed above, for example 
playing music, show that some capabilities are such that they 
bring benefits to others. There are also capabilities – for 
example cars or other artifacts – which bring benefits to their 
owners or to some other entities distinct from the bearer of the 
capability. This can be true also of natural entities. 
Niagara Falls, for example, has the disposition to increase the 
relative humidity in the area around the base of the falls, but we 
would not say this is a capability of the Falls because it is not 
bringing a benefit to any organism in the normal case. On the 
other hand, Niagara Falls also has the disposition to attract 
tourists – and in this case we may indeed be talking about a 
capability of the Falls, a thesis that is supported by the fact that 
engineers are regularly commissioned to manage its flow. 
Niagara Falls as currently managed is comparable to a car, or to 
any other artifact created by design to bring benefits to its owner 
or user. Here the benefits are brought to the tourists who use 
Niagara Falls as a tourist destination. 
 
The benefits that capabilities bring are characterized by aiding 
the interests of the organisms. An organism’s interests can 
range from mere animalistic survival to a human being living a 
fulfilling life. Some dispositions possessed by both organisms 
and non-organisms aide in the interest of one organism or 
another. As long as the realizations of these dispositions can be 
used to serve the interests of an organism, that disposition is a 
capability. Understood in this way, one can see how the car’s 
disposition to provide heat is a capability – it aids in the physical 
well-being of any organism being kept warm within the car. 
Moreover, a human’s capability to make autonomous decisions 
improves their well-being insofar as being able to act 
autonomously contributes toward their flourishing as a human. 
They can lead a more fulfilling life as an autonomous, free 
agent, than as a slave for example.  
Fiat Capabilities 
A fiat object is an object that does not have physical or bona 
fide boundaries (15). For example, Hawaii is a fiat object 
because there is no physical discontinuity that separates it from 
its surroundings. The archipelago is a single entity because a 
political fiat boundary has been drawn around it, a boundary 
that exists not physically but rather institutionally. 
Similarly, some capabilities are really groups of more basic 
capabilities, functions, or dispositions. When we pick out these 
fiat capabilities, we are picking out a group of more basic 
capabilities that we often use singular terms to refer to. For 
example, the assassin’s capability to make his hit look like an 
accident might require the capability to plan a hit, to 
undiscoverably manipulate a car brake system, to track his 
target’s movements, and so forth. These all contribute to the fiat 
capability of being able to make his target’s death look like an 
accident, and the realization of the assassin’s capability consists 
in realizing these other capabilities.  
Similarly, a Tae Kwon Do Master’s capability to practice Tae 
Kwon Do consists in a group of other capabilities. The Tae 
Kwon Do master has capabilities to perform a myriad of 
different techniques including blocks, kicks, and punches. Each 
individual technique is a capability on its own.  
Fiat capabilities also allow us to distinguish differences 
between instances of a capability. Both a Tae Kwon Do master 
and a Tae Kwon Do student possess the capability to practice 
Tae Kwon Do, but the student is less capable than the master. 
One reason for this is that the master possesses a greater number 
of capabilities, which we include within the fiat capability 
involved in Tae Kwon Do. Since the latter is a fiat capability, 
we can account for different ability levels among bearers of this 
capability based on how many specific capabilities that 
contribute to the fiat capability are possessed.  
Barton et al. have proposed a variety of ways that more basic 
dispositions are able to compose a greater disposition [17]. 
More specific but strictly speaking different dispositions 
(Barton et al. uses the example of a domino’s disposition to fall 
to left and its disposition to fall to the right as composing a 
greater disposition to fall) can compose a disposition that 
encompasses both. This is part of the idea behind fiat 
dispositions. The guitarist’s capability to play guitar could very 
well be composed of her capability to fret the neck and her 
capability to strum. This way of combining dispositions as well 
as the other axioms that Barton et al. have proposed are 
consistent with our view of fiat capabilities. Their axioms for 
combining dispositions when applied to fiat capabilities such as 
the capability to play guitar or to speak German.  
Abilities whose bearers are both mental and physiological 
Acquiring an ability involves in many cases undergoing 
physiological changes beyond the neurological. To acquire the 
ability to play the piano, for example, requires that the joints in 
your fingers becoming gradually more flexible in order that you 
can play progressively more complex pieces. An ability to 
speak German, similarly, involves both physical components 
(involved in creating sounds) and mental components 
(corresponding for example to the speaker’s knowledge of 
German grammar). There are then physiological structures 
outside the brain which are partial bearers, along with neuronal 
networks, of acquired abilities. 
BFO and cognitive representation 
Cognitive representations are relevant to mental capabilities 
insofar as cognitive representations are involved in the 
processes that realize the capability. A guitarist playing a song 
might visualize the chord shapes of her fretting hand, a 
technique which helps her fret the chords accurately. Similarly, 
visualization occurs while reading [16], meaning that visual as 
well as linguistic cognitive representations are present when the 
capability to use language is realized. 
Reed and Dumontier [16] contend that BFO is not as well suited 
as other ontologies due to its realist orientation. They contend 
this is one reason why a cognitive representation is defined in 
BFO as a specifically dependent continuant which depends on 
“an anatomical structure in the cognitive system of an 
organism” [16]. Their contention is that these representations 
may exist independently of any anatomical structure, but BFO 
is not able to capture this, since the entities it captures must 
correspond to reality. 
The realist orientation of BFO does not, however, prevent it 
from capturing cognitive representations. A cognitive 
representation needs to inhere in some kind of cognitive 
structure. Otherwise it could not exist. A cognitive 
representation is only a cognitive representation if it exists in a 
mind. So unless one is willing to argue that minds can exist 
independently of brains (or perhaps some other physical 
structure like a computer if technology brings us so far), one 
must accept that cognitive representations inhere in a cognitive 
system. BFO’s realist orientation gives it the aim of describing 
reality. To the extent that cognitive representations are a part of 
reality, BFO’s framework will be able to describe them.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose capability as a new subclass of 
disposition, defined in such a way that all functions are 
capabilities and all capabilities are dispositions. In addition, we 
propose ability as those capabilities which are intentionally 
realizable by the bearer, and we have demarcated the kinds of 
bearer that a capability or ability has, focusing especially on 
mental abilities.  
We remain neutral as to whether the term ‘capability’ should be 
added to BFO, or whether it should form part of a new 
Capability Ontology descending directly from BFO by analogy 
with the Information Artifact Ontology. 
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Response to Reviewers 
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their 
thorough feedback and criticisms. The comments provided 
were extremely helpful in improving the paper. The biggest 
changes that were made was a revision of our definition of 
capability, and the addition of a lengthier discussion defending 
our idea that all functions are capabilities.  
Our change to the definition of ‘capability’ was minor but 
useful in avoiding a primary worry raised by one of the 
reviewers. The definition of ‘capability’ now requires that the 
realization of this disposition bring a benefit to some organism 
rather than the bearer. This allows non-living things (and 
organisms, but it is particularly relevant for non-living objects) 
to bear dispositions that are capabilities as they benefit some 
organism and need not benefit themselves. Partially to address 
what counts as a ‘benefit’, which is crucial to our definition of 
‘capability’, more time was spent explaining what we mean by 
benefit and showing that all functions must benefit some 
organism. By being more thorough in our argumentation to this, 
we hope to have better addressed both reviewers’ worry that 
there are some functions, which are not capabilities.  
We also heeded one reviewer’s advice to incorporate an article 
discussing the mereology of dispositions. This change 
improved our paper by having it interact with further relevant 
literature, and specifically improved our section of fiat 
capabilities by drawing on some of the work already done on 
the mereology of dispositions. We believe that our account of 
fiat capabilities (and dispositions) is consistent with work 
already being done on the topic. Finally, care was taken to 
thoroughly address the comments on specific areas of the text, 
either to fix errors or provide additional clarification or 
argumentation where necessary.  
 
